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RADIO PROPAGANDA REPORT

SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE NATURE OF THE NUCLEAR WAR THREAT

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Research Series
(Intelligence Problem Study)

RS.18

25 June 1958

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PER E.O. 12958
Agency: CIA
Date: 9-17-99
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PROPAGANDA REPORT
25 JUNE 1958

SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE NATURE OF THE NUCLEAR WAR THREAT

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Summary

1. The danger of an "accidental war" is a relatively new theme in Soviet propaganda. It was first discussed in detail after Khrushchev--reacting to last fall's U.S. announcement that nuclear-armed planes were constantly aloft--warned that such flights could accidentally trigger a war. Stress has been on the danger that a pilot might drop a bomb as the result of a "misunderstanding" or "derangement." Secondly, it has been argued that either side might mistakenly construe a mishap as the start of a real attack, or that an individual U.S. pilot might act out of "evil intent" to start a war his government did not want.

Propagandists concentrated at first on the SAC flights over Europe, in an apparent effort to exploit neutralist sentiment and fears of nuclear war in the allied countries. The charge that planes were flying "toward Soviet frontiers" via the Arctic was not introduced until April, when Moscow mounted its only extensive propaganda campaign against the SAC flights. Full-length commentaries on the danger from the flights have virtually ceased since May, but references to the subject have persisted.

2. Attacks on Western advocates of preventive war, in a flurry of comment reacting to the Gaither report, appeared in Soviet propaganda shortly after the accidental-war theme was introduced. But Moscow stopped short of imputing a preventive-war policy to the U.S. Administration. Western press charges that the USSR had itself approved such a strategy were denied; it was explained for the first time that "Soviet theoretical statements" on forestalling surprise attack had been misinterpreted as calls for preventive war.
3. The Western concept of localized nuclear war was introduced and rejected in Soviet propaganda in March 1957. Khrushchev argued against the local war theory for the first time last November, just one day before he warned that SAC flights could accidentally trigger a war. Bulganin spelled out the argument in December: war cannot be localized in an era of modern weapons with no "geographical limits" and opposing military alliances. Later that month, in comment on the Gaither report, propagandists charged that the United States was turning to the local war theory because of the "bankruptcy" of its massive retaliation policy.
4. Assertions that it is possible to prevent war have continued to appear in Soviet propaganda since the thesis was introduced at the XX CPSU Congress. But it is made clear that the basis for war remains

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Foreword

Although Soviet propaganda over the past year has retained its basic portrayal of an aggressive West resisting Soviet efforts for peace, it has not presented world war resulting from premeditated Western aggression as an immediate danger. Since the introduction at the XX CPSU Congress of the thesis that wars are no longer "fataлистically inevitable," Soviet spokesmen have insisted that war can be prevented. Particularly since the ICBM test and sputnik launchings, Soviet military capability has been credited with having a deterrent effect on would-be Western aggressors.

Since last fall, however, Moscow has sought to convey the idea that there is a serious danger of world war being touched off "by accident," particularly by some mishap involving SAC flights.

The Malenkov heresy that world war would destroy civilization is still rejected. The official line remains that such a war would mean the end of the capitalist system. But Soviet spokesmen have shown increasing frankness in recent months in acknowledging the damage both sides would suffer in a global war. Consistent with such acknowledgments has been a reluctance to couch predictions of the demise of capitalism in terms of a Soviet military victory. The destruction of capitalism in a new war is explained as inevitable because "the peoples" would no longer tolerate a system that breeds war.

This report traces the past year's Soviet propaganda on major themes related to the likelihood, danger and consequences of a nuclear world war. Statements by Soviet political and military leaders, Soviet newspaper and journal articles, and routine radio propaganda have been examined. A number of propaganda lines with respect to nuclear war appeared first in the political-affairs journal INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

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so long as imperialism exists. And the West is cautioned that the "status quo"--the existence of two world systems--must be recognized if war is to be averted.

5. Capitalism's destruction in a global war remains the official Soviet line, with Khrushchev the main spokesman for the thesis. It has been voiced by only two other Presidium members--Furtseva and Shvernik--in more than a year, and has appeared only once in routine Moscow radio propaganda. Capitalism's demise is normally not predicted in terms of Soviet military victory, but is said to be inevitable because "the peoples" would no longer tolerate a system that breeds war.

The Malenkov heresy that world war would destroy civilization is still rejected, but Soviet leaders and propagandists have shown increasing frankness in acknowledging the damage both sides would suffer in a global war.

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SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE NATURE OF THE NUCLEAR WAR THREAT

A. NEW STRESS ON DANGER OF "ACCIDENTAL WAR"

The idea that there is a serious danger of world war being touched off by accident has been conveyed in Soviet propaganda since last November, when Khrushchev professed concern in his interview with Hearst over the reported flights of U.S. planes carrying H-bombs. Before that, Moscow propagandists had never discussed accidental war in detail. Even use of the term "accidental war" had been rare: In the six months before the Hearst interview, Khrushchev twice referred explicitly to the danger of war by accident, but both times only briefly:*

1. He told the editor of the Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN on 18 June 1957 that when nuclear arms are stockpiled, "hotheads may be tempted to use them.... One cannot permit war to be unleashed by a mere accident...."
2. In his 11 May 1957 interview with Turner Catledge of the New York TIMES, he had said that "since atomic and hydrogen weapons, rockets and intercontinental missiles exist, the possibility is not excluded that by some fatal mistake or accident a war might be unleashed...."

Khrushchev's warnings were quoted in a few commentaries--but only to foreign, particularly North American, listeners.

Although Soviet spokesmen have kept away from explicit discussion of accidental war, the idea has been implicit in Moscow's repeated warnings of the dangers inherent in a continued nuclear arms race. For example, Bulganin's 20 April 1957 letter to Prime Minister Macmillan pictured a dangerous situation in Europe, where opposing forces faced each other with up-to-date and most destructive weapons: "It is not said without reason that loaded guns go off on their own account."**

November 1957: Khrushchev Sets Off Minor Propaganda Effort

General Power's 12 November statement in Paris that U.S. bombers carrying H-bombs were constantly aloft was ignored by Moscow until after Khrushchev's 22 November interview with Hearst.*** But the day after the

* All Khrushchev's statements on the subject are reproduced in Tab A.

** The "dangerous situation" in Europe is described more precisely in the 5 May 1958 Soviet Government proposals on a summit agenda, released 17 June: In the passage on a nuclear-free zone, the document states that the two alignments of states in Central Europe create a threat to peace: "One must not overlook the fact that in such a situation, evil design or accident might start off another war with the use of the most modern means of destruction--nuclear and rocket weapons."

*** Khrushchev did not refer to General Power by name, saying merely "it was reported" that nuclear-armed bombers were constantly in the air. But Bulganin, in his December letter to Belgium's Van Acker, said that "according to the Commander of SAC, Power, since October of this year a considerable number of American bombers carrying nuclear bombs have been flying around the clock over the territories of a number of West European countries."

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interview took place--and six days before it was released by Soviet media-- a broadcast to North America reported "indignation" in Britain over the news that American bombers had received orders to be in combat readiness. After the release of the interview, commentators warned both of the danger to allied territories from an accidental explosion or crash and of an "accidental" war touched off by a pilot's mistake or mental aberration.

The propaganda effort was given new impetus by Bulganin's December and January letters to NATO powers and the United Nations. The danger of the flights was cited in a resolution of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in Cairo, held from 26 December to 1 January: "The carrying of nuclear bombs continuously by planes may result in the outbreak of atomic war even by mischance." Similar statements were made by the Bureau of the World Peace Council on 25 March, and by the WFTU Executive Committee during its 30 March - 2 April session in Prague.

April 1958: Stepped-Up Campaign After Gromyko Protest

It was not until late April, after Gromyko called for Security Council action to stop SAC flights "toward the USSR," that Moscow gave extensive publicity to the nuclear-armed-planes issue:

In the 21 weeks from late November until mid-April, Moscow had broadcast 119 commentaries warning of the danger both of an accidental war and of an accident involving an explosion or crash on allied territory. Forty-three of these played up the danger of accidental war; the other 76 put primary stress on the danger to allied territories from the SAC flights, but frequently went on to caution that the flights could lead to an accidental war.

In the week of Gromyko's 18 April protest there were 95 commentaries, and in the following week 154. The volume in the two weeks following the protest thus amounted to more than twice the total for the entire 21-week period from November to mid-April. There were some 80 commentaries on the subject in the week ending 4 May, when the Security Council was debating the U.S. call for Arctic inspection, but the propaganda dropped off sharply after that--to 27 commentaries in the next two weeks and only some 10 full-length discussions of the SAC flights since then. Frequent passing references to the danger inherent in the flights have persisted, however, both in routine propaganda and elite statements. The danger was most recently cited by Khrushchev in his 24 May speech to the Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Treaty powers.

Foreign audiences heard most of the propaganda on the SAC flights. Soviet listeners heard only three or 119 commentaries in the November-April period. They heard a somewhat larger proportion of the comment in the two weeks after Gromyko's protest--15 out of 249 broadcasts--but there was no full-length comment on the subject at all in the home service during the seven weeks from 4 May until 18 June. Forty-seven commentaries denounced the SAC flights to audiences abroad during the same seven-week period.

New Warning to Canada After Gromyko Protest

Comment just after Gromyko's protest had routinely referred to U.S. flights "over the Arctic." Specific reference was made to Canada for the first time in a 27 April broadcast to North America: Under international law, any country permitting war planes of another country to fly over its territory to attack a third power bears "all the responsibility" for the acts of the attacking country."

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In his 30 May letter to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Khrushchev cautioned Canadian leaders that they should not be indifferent to the SAC flights, which constitute "a serious danger to Canada too." Bulganin's December and January letters to Prime Minister Diefenbaker had not included references to the dangers from U.S. flights over allied territories, although such assertions were incorporated in several of the letters to other NATO leaders.

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In its only reference to the Canadian proposal for a Western inspection system in the Arctic, Moscow (to North America, 3 June) represented the New York HERALD TRIBUNE as construing that proposal as a "whitewashing" of the flights by giving them the appearance of collective defense efforts.

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SAC Planes Poised for "Attack Against USSR"

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The charge that the U.S. planes were flying directly "toward the USSR" was introduced into Soviet propaganda four days before Gromyko's 18 April call for Security Council action to halt the flights which allegedly could result in accidental war. Foreign-language broadcasts on 14 April anticipated the Foreign Minister's charge that the planes were approaching Soviet frontiers, but not his pinpointing of the Arctic flights.

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It had already been made clear, however, that the ultimate target of the U.S. flights was the Soviet Union. Khrushchev had told Hearst that according to Western reports "a part of the U.S. bomber force, with hydrogen and atomic bombs, is constantly in the air and always ready to strike against the Soviet Union." In his 8 January letter to the President, Bulganin said that the flights "constitute actions directed against the Soviet Union and other peaceloving countries."

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USSR Could Mistake SAC Flight for Real Attack

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Propaganda before Gromyko's protest had said that war might result from a Soviet "counteraction" following an accidental dropping of a bomb, but Moscow had not spelled out the consequences of a simultaneous Soviet miscalculation. In his 18 April press conference, Gromyko said:

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After all, meteors and electronic interference are reflected on Soviet radar screens too. If in such cases Soviet aircraft, loaded with atomic and hydrogen bombs, were to proceed in the direction of the United States and its bases in other states, the air fleets of both sides, having noticed each other somewhere over the Arctic regions, under such circumstances would draw the natural conclusion that a real attack by the enemy was taking place, and mankind would find itself involved in the whirlpool of atomic war.

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In his 29 April statement to press correspondents, Gromyko additionally posed an even more frightening possibility:

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U.S. bombers which are known to carry atomic and hydrogen bombs will during one of their flights violate the frontier of the Soviet Union, and thus the necessity will arise to send rockets to repel the imminent menace. And rockets cannot be turned back.

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This blunt threat was repeated in a single commentary broadcast to North America on 4 May. The only others to hear it were the Soviet and German

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audiences, to whom the full text of Gromyko's press statement was broadcast. The threat was excluded from summaries of Gromyko's press statements broadcast to other countries.

U.S. Officers Could Fail to Recall Planes in Time

In his 18 April statement Gromyko concentrated on the possibility that "U.S. generals" might fail to call the planes back in time. While earlier propaganda had stressed pilot error, there had also been some expressions of concern over the "power" of commanding officers on the spot to decide on the use of atomic weapons.

In his 10 December letter to Prime Minister Macmillan, Bulganin said that

the U.S. Secretary of State recently stated outright that the U.S. officer on the spot has the right to decide whether or not military actions should begin.

This same point was made--without specific reference to Dulles--in the January letters to Gaillard, Drees and Van Acker and in the Soviet note to Portugal.

But most comment after Gromyko's 18 April statement reverted to Khrushchev's earlier warning in the Hearst interview about a "mistaken" or "mad" pilot.

United States Could Mistake Exploding Bomb for Soviet ICBM

The day after Gromyko's press conference, an Italian-language commentary on the South Carolina military plane accident took a new tack: Commentator Dobrov posed the possibility of an exploding bomb being taken for "a Soviet ICBM" and of subsequent U.S. counteraction.* In his 24 May speech to the Warsaw Treaty conference, Khrushchev asked what would have happened if the bomb in South Carolina had exploded:

What is to prevent an accidental explosion of an American atomic or hydrogen bomb on American territory, or on the territory of some other nation over which American H-bombers are flying, being taken for a surprise attack? There is nothing to guarantee that this will not happen. Thus, an accidental atomic bomb explosion may well trigger another world war.

* Commentators have studiously ignored Western assurances that the nuclear bombs aboard U.S. planes are not fused. Moscow newscasts last January, promptly reporting a crash of a nuclear-armed bomber in the United States, said that "Washington claims the atom bomb did not explode." A subsequent widely broadcast foreign-language commentary described the U.S. announcement as an "attempt to reassure" U.S. allies. But the commentator concluded that even though the bomb did not explode this time, it is "too dangerous to hope that this stroke of luck will be repeated."

A few weeks later, in his 31 January interview with the London TIMES (released by TASS on 15 February), Khrushchev ridiculed Acting Prime Minister Butler's statements in the House of Commons that the bombs are not charged.

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This line was used again on 18 June in a Stepanov commentary broadcast to Britain and in a Vishnevsky PRAVDA article broadcast in the home service. Both commentators quoted General Phillips, military correspondent of the St. Louis POST DISPATCH, as cautioning that an accidental atomic-bomb explosion in the United States or some allied country might be blamed by the U.S. Government on "enemies" and might thus provoke the United States into initiating nuclear action.

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War Could Break Out "Through Someone's Evil Intent"

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At his 29 April press conference, Gromyko summed up a variety of possible causes of accidental war: incorrect interpretation of U.S. radarscopes, a misrepresented signal, a mentally disturbed crew of one bomber. He concluded by warning that U.S. flights create an intolerable situation in which a new world war might break out at any moment "either through someone's evil design or even through a fortuitous concurrence of circumstances."

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The idea of "evil intent" had been brought up in the accidental-war context in several of Bulganin's December letters. Later that month, in his 21 December Supreme Soviet address, Khrushchev said that one pilot might, "even without evil intent but through nervous derangement or an incorrectly understood order," drop his deadly load. Some of Bulganin's January letters repeated his own earlier statement; but others, echoing Khrushchev, said "possibly with no evil intent."*

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Medical "Evidence" for Possibility of Pilot Blackout

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The propaganda has contained some purported medical documentation for the claim that a pilot could suffer a mental blackout. On 11 January, TASS transmitted a letter to the Soviet Peace Committee from a Soviet "forensic psychiatrist" who called the warnings about a fatal error or fit of madness justified. He said experimental work had demonstrated that quickly-passing mental disorders occur particularly in airmen who are continually subject to the effects of frequent changes in atmospheric pressure and highly rarefied air, "which has a considerable effect on higher nervous activity."

A 21 April home service talk pointed out that Richard Habler, in his book on SAC, called the flights extremely tiring for airmen:

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* The possibility of "evil intent" was raised by Bulganin in his December letters to Gaillard, Zoli, Gerhardsen and in the note to U.N. members. Evil intent was not posed as a possibility in the December letters to Macmillan, Hansen or Nehru. In the letter to Van Acker Bulganin alluded to danger from the SAC flights but did not specifically warn of accidental war.

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In Bulganin's January letters, the danger of "evil intent" was reiterated to Gaillard and Zoli and brought up to Drees and Adenauer as well as in the Soviet note to Portugal. "Evil intent" was not mentioned in the letter to Macmillan or in the one to Menderes.

Bulganin echoed Khrushchev's formulation "even without evil intent" in his January letters to Gerhardsen and Hansen (the former--but not the latter--having been warned of evil intent in the December letters) and to Jonasson.

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Even the contact of clothing, he writes, becomes nearly intolerable in view of the heightened skin sensitivity; the degree of tension approaches the limit.

The commentator said it was for this reason that Habler concluded that "a third world war could easily start as a result of some error."

As further documentation of the accidental-war danger, Moscow cited on 21 May--for foreign audiences only--an alleged secret 27 March letter from Dr. Frank Berry to Defense Secretary McElroy, published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.* Broadcasts said the letter revealed that "over two-thirds" of all U.S. airmen were suffering from psychoneurosis, particularly those "crews of nuclear-armed planes" circling over NATO countries, flying across the Arctic "almost to the very borders of the USSR," and taking off from U.S. airfields at every alert signal. The commentator concluded that if a "mentally unstable flyer" passed the breaking point and lost control of himself during a flight over the Arctic toward the USSR, "the world would be plunged into a nuclear war."

Dr. Berry's alleged findings were referred to again in 18 June broadcasts reporting an incident in England involving an intoxicated U.S. flyer and a plane equipped to carry nuclear bombs. The accident was said to have confirmed Berry's claim that "Air Force personnel are so terrorized by war psychosis that the behavior of individual flyers may lead to a major catastrophe."

Moscow has also, though infrequently, quoted Western spokesmen to bolster its general contentions about the danger of an accidental war. Richard Habler's book was cited in April for the claim that General LeMay admitted that war could result "from a simple accident." During the same period, Soviet and foreign audiences heard that General Bradley had "admitted" that the present arms race, "involving rockets," places countries in greater danger from the consequences which are likely to arise from "the actions of some unbalanced person in charge of operations at a given moment." And on 18 June the St. Louis POST DISPATCH's military correspondent, General Phillips, was quoted as saying that "atomic bombs can always be primed and dropped by mistake."

* Excerpts from the Berry letter were reprinted in SOVIET FLEET on 9 May.

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B. ATTACKS ON ADVOCATES OF PREVENTIVE WAR

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Moscow has from time to time charged circles in the West with advocating "preventive war," although the subject has never been prominent in Soviet propaganda. A spate of such charges appeared last December, shortly after the first discussion of accidental war, in comment on the Gaither report. In the last week of December and the first two weeks of January, Moscow broadcast 13 commentary-length denunciations of preventive war and made numerous passing references to the concept in radio commentaries on other subjects. An article in the January INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS by M. Baturin, entitled "Peace and the Status Quo," said that the people who prepared the Gaither report for the National Security Council

go so far as to urge a "military policy of striking an enemy before an assault he obviously is about to make," or as they put it "to start with a victory."

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Several of Bulganin's January 1958 letters--proposing a summit meeting--charged that calls were being made for preventive war in "certain NATO countries."* But only in his letter to President Eisenhower (8 January) did Bulganin raise the question of what would result if such propaganda for preventive war were made in the USSR:

The dangerous nature of such calls becomes particularly clear if one considers the situation that would arise if similar calls began to be made in the countries against which the first blow is now being advocated.

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Bulganin again criticized U.S. preventive-war advocates in his letters to the President on 1 February and 6 March. In the latter, he picked up for the first time the December-January routine propaganda charge that the Gaither report testified to sentiment in the United States for preventive war. Two weeks earlier, on Armed Forces Day, Defense Minister Malinovsky had charged the NATO countries with "making propaganda for a preventive war."

Indirect acknowledgment that the U.S. Administration itself was not committed to a preventive-war policy appeared in Bulganin's 8 January letter to the President:

Let us consider these calls [for preventive war] as they are heard by the peoples of the states against which this fatal step is being urged, and not only as they are seen by the leaders of the countries where the calls are being made.

A 9 March German-language commentary by Lieutenant General Sergei Krasilnikov was more direct. After citing statements on preventive war by Drew Pearson and Hanson Baldwin, Krasilnikov said:

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* This euphemism was dropped only in the letter to Zoli; there Bulganin referred explicitly to such calls in the United States.

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Of course, the Soviet Union does not confuse the utterances of the supporters of a preventive war with the official policy of the United States.*

Denials that the USSR Would Wage Preventive War

Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly insisted that the USSR would never be the aggressor, that military means would be used only in retaliation. In the March issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (No. 3, signed to the press on 26 February 1958) Major General N. Talensky wrote:

In the Soviet Union no one speaks or thinks of using our advantage monopoly of the ICBM for a preventive war or sudden attack upon anyone.**

He said later in the same article that "it is impossible to imagine the combination of a peace-loving policy with a strategic concept of preventive war."

Talensky did not suggest that anyone was charging the USSR with such a policy. But Lieutenant General Sergei Krasilnikov, in his 9 March radio commentary, berated U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT for charging the USSR with "the desire for an aggressive preventive war against the United States":

U.S. NEWS uses, out of context, individual phrases and paragraphs from articles by Soviet military people which were published in the Soviet press in the last two to three years, distorts their meaning, and does not even stop at crass invention.

On 27 April, General V. Kurasov in RED STAR denied Western contentions--particularly those by Herbert Dinerstein in the January issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS--that the Soviet Union had officially approved the strategy of preventive war in 1955. Expanding on Krasilnikov's arguments, Kurasov said:

The appearance of nuclear weapons and the possibilities of their massed use against groups and objects in the rear caused various interpretations of the importance of a surprise attack in a future war and of measures of repelling this attack. This prompted several military authors to take up the study of the importance of the factor of surprise in modern war.

The theoretical statements of individual authors in the press on ways to frustrate a surprise attack by an aggressor have been interpreted by the Western press as a call for preventive war.

And Defense Minister Malinovsky wrote in PRAVDA on 9 May:

The USSR, as a socialist state, has never been and will never be the initiator of a war. Our peace-loving policy does not permit

* Air Marshal Vershinin's 8 September PRAVDA interview did seem, however, to treat preventive war as a serious element of Western military strategic planning: Vershinin insisted that a Western surprise attack on the USSR could not succeed in the face of Soviet military might.

** This passage was included in a brief 6 March TASS review of the article.

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any kind of "preventive preventivnaya war," "pre-emptive uprezhdayushchisya blows" or "surprise attack" about which some foreign slanderers are trumpeting.

In castigating the U.S. proposal for Arctic inspection to help forestall a surprise attack, Gromyko at his 29 April press conference said:

As for the danger of surprise attack on the United States, is it American aircraft that the leading officials of the United States fear? For there is no danger of this kind to the United States from any other quarter, and no one else brandishes atomic and hydrogen bombs.

Khrushchev used the same argument in a rhetorical question in his 30 May letter to Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker:

Can the Soviet Union in such conditions Arctic flights and U.S. foreign bases accept any measures which could disarm it in face of the danger of attack and which would reduce its capability to give a rebuff in the way of self-defense and self-defense alone?

Little Urgency About Steps to Forestall Surprise Attack

Despite the expressions of concern over alleged Western sentiment in favor of preventive war, there has been little sense of urgency in Soviet propaganda regarding summit negotiations on the forestalling of surprise attack.

A discussion of "measures to guard against surprise attack" was one of the agenda items suggested in the 8 January Soviet proposals for a summit meeting, and the subject was again raised in the 5 May Soviet proposals (released by Moscow on 17 June). But Moscow propagandists, while giving sustained attention to such proposed agenda items as a nuclear test ban and a nuclear-free zone in Europe, have virtually ignored the surprise-attack issue.

The bid for discussion of measures against surprise attack has been mentioned in general reviews of the Soviet-proposed agenda, but even then there has been scarcely any reiteration of the specific measures proposed in the 8 January and 5 May documents. Some propaganda attention has been given the proposal for an 800-kilometer zone subject to aerial photography in central Europe, but Soviet commentators have ignored the proposal for control posts at large railway junctions, at large ports and on main motor roads.*

* Since the 8 January proposals, only three elite statements have recalled the fact that the USSR has proposed measures to guard against surprise attack--Khrushchev's 9 May letter to President Eisenhower, the 16 May Soviet Foreign Ministry statement, and Khrushchev's 30 May letter to Diefenbaker.

The Soviet proposal on central European aerial inspection was recalled--without specific reference to surprise attack--in Khrushchev's 10 April speech at a mass meeting in Moscow and by Gromyko at his 29 April press conference. These statements are included in Radio Propaganda Report RS.17 of 9 June 1958, "Soviet Elite Statements on Inspection and Control of Nuclear Disarmament."

The proposal for control posts at communication junctions was first advanced in the 10 May 1955 Soviet disarmament proposals, and the Central European aerial inspection plan was introduced in November 1956.

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C. REJECTION OF CONCEPT OF LOCAL WAR

Now, when there are ICBMs, should war be unleashed by the imperialists, it will inevitably engulf the whole world... Contemporary strategy stresses with all clarity that the all-embracing nature of war is an inevitable and logical development. At present a local war can be nothing but the initial stage of world war. (Major General Talensky, editor of MILITARY THOUGHT, in the March 1958 issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS)*

Just one year before this flat rejection of the possibility of localizing a war in the nuclear age, V. Kamenev had broached the question of limited atomic war for the first time in Soviet propaganda--in the same journal, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.**

Discussion of minor wars, not specified as nuclear, leading into major ones had first appeared in Soviet propaganda during the Suez crisis in September 1956. During the Syrian crisis last year, Moscow expressed concern that the "aggression" against Syria might spread. Such warnings were issued in routine propaganda, by Bulganin (in his 10 September letter to Menderes), by Gromyko (in his 20 September address to the United Nations), and in the CPSU's 15 October letters to European socialist parties. The East German news agency, though not Soviet media, reported that at an 8 October GDR Embassy reception Khrushchev stressed Soviet efforts to prevent a war but said that "it would be difficult to localize a war once the guns were firing and rockets flying."

A flurry of comment on the impossibility of localized nuclear war was occasioned late last summer and fall by the publication of Henry Kissinger's book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" and by Secretary Dulles' article in the October issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS. And on 2 October the World Peace Council Executive Committee--in demanding a test ban--rejected the Western concepts of localized atomic wars and tactical atomic weapons.*** But routine broadcast discussion of the limited-war thesis remained sparse.

Khrushchev argued against the concept of small wars for the first and only time in a 21 November 1957 interview with Brazilian journalists (released by TASS on 5 December). After saying that though no prewar situation

* Talensky's article was not broadcast by Radio Moscow, but the passage cited above was included in a brief TASS review of the article.

** It was also in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, in January 1955, that Talensky introduced into Soviet propaganda the line that the West was "falsely" distinguishing between tactical and strategic atomic weapons. For a discussion of this propaganda line and of Kamenev's initial comment on limited atomic war, see Radio Propaganda Report CD.78 of 1 October 1957, "Soviet Propaganda on Tactical Atomic Weapons and Limited War."

*** The WPC's 16 June 1957 declaration on a nuclear truce and disarmament, adopted at Colombo, said: "Through various pacts and treaties, the armed forces of a number of countries are to receive so-called tactical atomic weapons. But these weapons increase the risk that any local dispute can become quickly transformed into an atomic war."

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exists, there are potential "incendiary" areas in the Middle East, Europe, Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam,* Khrushchev added:

The theory of so-called local or minor wars with the use of mass-destruction weapons has now sprung up in the West. With such wars the imperialists want to suppress the national liberation movement and do away with governments which do not suit them. Yet we must not think that under present conditions minor wars would be localized. Should such wars break out, they could soon grow into a world war.**

Opposing Military Alliances Preclude Localized War

The day after Khrushchev's interview was released, a German-language talk by Radio Moscow's Colonel Vasilyev contained the first discussion of the impossibility of localized war in Europe. Vasilyev argued that a small war "in Europe" is precluded by the existence of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

In his December letters to NATO heads of government, Bulganin detailed the Soviet argument against the Western concept of localized war: War cannot be localized in an era of nuclear weapons with no geographical limits and of the existence of two opposing military groupings. Bulganin's arguments were echoed in supporting propaganda, including a 13 December PRAVDA editorial. In the letter to Gaillard, Bulganin added, "Today the maxim that peace is indivisible is truer than ever before."***

Neither Khrushchev nor Gromyko addressed themselves to the concept in their Supreme Soviet speeches on 21 December. But late in December,

* In the February 1958 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Major-General Talensky wrote that the "local war theorists lay emphasis on Central Europe, the Middle East, Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam as places where their notion is likely to be applied.... The strategy of local wars is clearly aimed at countries waging national liberation struggles."

** In his 24 May speech at the Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Treaty powers Khrushchev said "By ending war against Algeria and thereby eliminating the danger of it possibly becoming a large-scale conflict" France would contribute to international peace. But Khrushchev did not mention the Western theory of local war.

*** In his 8 January 1958 letter to Afghan Premier Daud, Bulganin said: "Indeed the thesis that peace is indivisible is more true now than ever before, and if a dangerous tension arises in any part of the world it cannot in our time fail to affect other states in one way or another."

The indivisibility-of-peace theme reappeared for the first time in postwar Soviet propaganda in an article in NEWS by Ilya Ehrenburg, broadcast by Moscow in French on 19 September 1953. Chinese Communist propagandists voiced the thesis in June 1954 in connection with the Chou-Nehru talks; it was repeated by the CPR spokesman at the Moscow collective security conference in December 1954 and at the Warsaw Treaty Organization's inaugural meeting in May 1955.

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propagandists rejected the "local war" theory in attacks on the Gaither report. German listeners on 27 December heard Colonel Vasilyev declare categorically that "any little war against a state would automatically lead to a world war." In the January 1958 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (signed for the press on 20 December 1957), M. Baturin said that acceptance of "the real state of affairs" was

incompatible with a policy of "local" or limited atomic wars, which are liable to develop into a universal nuclear conflagration.

In some of his January letters accompanying the Soviet proposals for a summit conference, Bulganin attacked the local war theory by indirection. Arguing for a relaxation of international tension, Bulganin said that a fatal step by any individual country could, "as a result of obligations binding it to other states, entail countless disasters for many people and create a general conflagration."

Since the January letters, there have been only some 10 full-length commentaries--none in the home service--on the subject of limited war. In a PRAVDA article commemorating V-E Day, summarized by TASS and Moscow radio, Defense Minister Malinovsky wrote:

In reply to groundless and silly twaddle of the imperialists about the possibility of conducting limited wars, the USSR has clearly declared that under contemporary conditions any war can entail world conflict; it may be only the prelude to an unlimited, destructive war.

Local-War Theory Masks Western War Plans

Propaganda after the ICBM test and the sputnik launchings declared that some U.S. circles realized that the risk of unleashing a universal war was too great to be justified. A Zorin home service commentary on 25 December said the Gaither report acknowledged that total war had ceased to be an important tool of national policy, but

the authors of the doctrine of limited war, instead of concluding that it is necessary to forego war as a tool of national policy, arrive at an entirely different conclusion: They argue as soon as total war becomes too dangerous, it must be replaced by limited war.

A number of articles in the Soviet military press during December and January said that the United States was turning to the theory of limited war because its plans for establishing world domination by unleashing total atomic war was getting less support. The limited-war theory, it was argued, was the latest device to hoodwink the United States' allies. Military press articles said that the U.S. doctrine of massive retaliation had increasingly revealed its bankruptcy: Particularly after the successful ICBM test, circles in the United States regarded the gamble of total war as suicidal for the United States.

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D. WESTERN-PLANNED WAR "NOT FATALISTICALLY INEVITABLE"

Soviet charges that the West is accelerating preparations for nuclear war are balanced by assurances that such a war can and must be prevented. The thesis introduced at the XX CPSU Congress that wars are "no longer fatalistically inevitable" has only occasionally been restated explicitly by Soviet leaders and propagandists. It was reiterated most recently in late May at the Moscow conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization--both in the conference declaration and by Khrushchev.*

Propaganda on the Warsaw powers' conference did not cite the thesis directly, but--like past routine broadcasts--stressed that the strength of peace-loving peoples is now such as to act as a strong deterrent force on would-be aggressors. In keeping with Moscow's emphasis on the importance of the "people's" role in preventing war, the 30 May PRAVDA editorial on the announcement of Lenin prizes also said that "war is not at all inevitable...."

A month earlier, in an article commemorating the anniversary of Lenin's birth, I. Popov wrote in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (No. 4) that

a brilliant example of profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of the contemporary international situation was afforded by the XX CPSU Congress. From a study of vital objective factors...there emerged the important theoretical conclusion that in our times war is no longer fatalistically inevitable....

It is not so easy for the imperialists to unleash war nowadays. But this does not mean that aggressive forces are not in a position to operate behind the backs of peoples, to enmesh them in war.

But Attempt to "Change Status Quo" Could Bring War

Only once in Soviet propaganda, in a speech by Khrushchev, has there been an explicit reference to conditions under which war would have to be regarded as inevitable. The day before he addressed the Warsaw Treaty powers, Khrushchev declared at a luncheon for visiting Finnish President Kekkonen:

* Before that, Khrushchev had referred specifically to the XX Congress thesis in his 10 March 1958 interview with the Polish TRYBUNA LUDU and in his interviews last November with the Toronto TELEGRAM and with U.P. correspondent Shapiro. Without explicitly voicing the thesis, he had discussed the possibility of preventing aggression in his interviews with James Reston (7 October 1957) and with Brazilian journalists (21 November 1957) and in his 21 December 1957 Supreme Soviet speech.

Khrushchev did not cite the thesis in his 6 November October Revolution address, although the CPSU Theses on the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, released on 15 September 1957, had reiterated that "war is not fatally inevitable in our time." The 12-Party declaration issued after the Moscow meeting on 22 November 1957 said that "an alliance of peace forces could prevent war."

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In order to establish stability in the world and avert a new war, it is necessary to recognize the status quo--that is, the prevailing situation--and not to try to change that situation by force. Otherwise, the inevitability of war will have to be recognized.

This statement is not incompatible with the XX CPSU Congress formulation of the thesis that wars are not fatalistically inevitable: The thesis was qualified by the proposition that the basis for war remains so long as imperialism exists. It is unique only by its explicitness with respect to the kind of situation in which the thesis would not be operative. Both routine and elite propaganda has in the past conveyed the sense of Khrushchev's statement--that world peace would be placed in jeopardy by any forcible attempt to upset the status quo based on the existence of two world power blocs, one of which includes the satellite regimes as presently constituted:

1. Propaganda attacks on the U.S. policy of "liberating the satellites" have occasionally included indirect warnings that such a policy could lead to war, although for the most part the emphasis has been simply on the impropriety, impermissibility, and even absurdity of such an "unrealistic" policy. Demands that the West recognize the status quo have been prominent in comment ruling out the idea that the satellite regimes and German unification were proper subjects for summit-meeting discussion.
2. Some of Bulganin's December 1957 letters included statements saying in effect what Khrushchev told Kekkonen. In the letter to Menderes, after declaring that the Soviet Union proceeds from the conviction that "under present conditions wars are not inevitable," Bulganin said:

If we are to proceed from the interests of safeguarding world peace, it is necessary in our opinion to recognize once and for all the situation prevailing in the world, in which capitalist and socialist states exist. We must all realize that any attempt to change this situation by force, to upset this "status quo," and any attempt at imposing any territorial change would bring about catastrophic consequences.

Bulganin left implicit only the precise nature of those "catastrophic consequences." In most of his other letters to Western heads of state that month, Bulganin broached the question of the preventability of war only in indirect reassertions of the XX Congress thesis--in criticisms of the West for its "intensive propaganda about the fatal inevitability of a new war." He explicitly restated the Congress thesis in his letter to Iceland's Jonasson and his note to all U.N. members. To Jonasson he said that "the Soviet Union as well as the People's Republic of China and other peace-loving states" believe that war is not inevitable.*

* Neither the European satellite speakers nor the CPR observer echoed Khrushchev's enunciation of the XX Congress thesis at the May Moscow conference, although it was incorporated in the conference declaration.

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Background on the Preventability-of-War Thesis

The thesis that war "is not fatalistically inevitable" was played up in a spate of propaganda immediately after its introduction at the XX CPSU Congress in February 1956. Candidate of Philosophy G. A. Fedorov assured the Soviet home audience on 17 March 1956 that the economic origin of wars by no means signifies that they break out automatically or spontaneously,* as economic crises do: Economic crises develop "with the force of elements, like unavoidable natural disasters," while wars are deliberately prepared and unleashed by the "exploiting countries."

In late April 1956, the Soviet May Day slogans--the first set of CPSU slogans to appear after the introduction of the preventability-of-war thesis--replaced the old Stalinist dictum that peace will be preserved if the peoples take its cause into their own hands by the XX Congress thesis that "war can and must be avoided."** Early in the same month Moscow broadcast a series of foreign-language commentaries on the preventability of war.

On 4 April, TASS carried a TRUD article which repeated the Congress explanation that the anti-war forces, while "insufficiently organized" in the past, had now acquired important means of preventing a new war and were capable of delivering a crushing rebuff to an aggressor. In enumerating the factors that made war preventable, TRUD cited the "zone of peace" including nonsocialist as well as socialist states, the "disintegration" of the colonialist system, and the movement for peace, in addition to the strengthened socialist camp.

After this flurry of explanations of the new thesis, propagandists virtually ignored the concept for months. But broadcasts late in 1956 declared that the foiling of the attack on Egypt had shown that the people were able "to stop war." And in his Supreme Soviet speech on 12 February 1957, Shepilov said that the developments in Hungary as well as in the Middle East had confirmed the correctness and viability of the thesis that in present conditions war is not fatalistically inevitable--that "wars can be prevented and stopped." Shepilov's sentiments were echoed nine months later in the 12-Party declaration issued after the Moscow conference on 22 November 1957. In his interview with Shapiro four days earlier, Khrushchev said the correctness of the XX Congress "decision" was confirmed by the "resistance to aggression in Egypt and the restraining of the Americans from launching a war in Syria." He did not mention Hungary.

* A year later, on 22 March 1957, a Fedorov article in RED STAR "On the Content of Soviet Military Ideology" reproved propagandists who give a "one-sided interpretation" to the question of wars in the modern epoch: Explaining the XX Congress thesis, they frequently concentrate their main attention on the question of the possibility of averting wars under modern historical conditions. But they speak off-handedly, as of something insignificant, about the possibility of the beginning of new wars by the imperialists. Yet fundamental to the XX Congress thesis is the fact that the economic basis of wars exists also now.

** The thesis was reasserted in the 1956 October Revolution anniversary slogans, dropped in the May Day 1957 slogans in favor of an admonition to "peace partisans" not to "allow the unleashing of a new war," then restored in October 1957. It was not restated in any form in the most recent set of slogans, the ones for May Day this year--a curious omission in view of the continued affirmation of the thesis by Khrushchev and in routine propaganda.

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E. FORECASTS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WORLD WAR

Increasing Frankness About Damage to Both Sides

Decreasing reluctance to acknowledge the mutual destruction which would result from a global war has been reflected in Soviet propaganda over the past year. This trend has been particularly marked since the Soviet ICBM test and the sputnik launchings. Statements in the past few months, by top Soviet leaders as well as by propagandists, have even approached the discredited "destruction-of-civilization" thesis which Malenkov voiced in his pre-election speech in March 1954 and recanted a month later.

That the issue is still highly sensitive was dramatically illustrated by PRAVDA's handling of Voroshilov's 26 April speech in Moscow on his return from Poland. As broadcast "live" in the Soviet home service, Voroshilov said:

Guided by the interests of general peace and security of mankind, we must do our utmost in order to prevent the resurrection of German militarism, which has already, during a brief period, twice unleashed wars of bloodshed; now it would not be bloodshed but simple annihilation of all life on earth. We know what nuclear weapons are.*

The underlined passage--clearly too close to the Malenkov heresy--was deleted from the text of the speech published in PRAVDA on 27 April. Yet ten days earlier, PRAVDA printed in full Khrushchev's 14 April letter to a Japanese anti-nuclear weapons group in which he expressed

the hope that the Japanese people...will do everything in their power to achieve the noble aim of preventing the threat of the outbreak of a rocket and nuclear war, which would spell ruin for all mankind.

A month before that, in his preelection speech, Khrushchev had gone further than he ever had before in warning graphically of worldwide destruction:

Apart from the direct damage, the use of nuclear arms will poison the atmosphere with radioactive fallout, and this may lead to the destruction of nearly all living organisms, especially in countries with restricted territory and dense population. Everything there can quite literally be wiped off the face of the earth.

Moscow radio comment has gone even beyond Khrushchev's predictions, and has contained forecasts similar to the one PRAVDA saw fit to excise from Voroshilov's speech:

* Voroshilov's warning was in direct contradiction to a statement he had made in a 26 March 1955 speech to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: "We cannot be intimidated by fables that in the event of a new world war civilization will perish." But at the XX CPSU Congress in February 1956, he said merely: "We defend peace because we know how great are the losses and destruction inflicted by modern warfare."

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1. A 20 June Chernakov commentary warned Swedish listeners that
now when there are nuclear weapons, no country, not even a neutral one, will escape unscathed from an atomic war: It would be a general extermination of mankind.
2. A 5 April broadcast to Norway cited "leading military specialists both in the East and the West" for the contention that under modern conditions, war could not settle international disputes because
use of the latest weapons could only lead to extermination on both sides, and not to victory in the ordinary sense of the word.
3. A broadcast to North America on 24 March, two weeks after Khrushchev's preelection speech, was more categorical than Khrushchev had been in warning any would-be aggressor that war would subject to a deadly risk
not only the well-being of his own country, but the future existence of the whole world.

Khrushchev Insists Only Capitalism Would Perish

Despite his acknowledgment of the devastation both sides would suffer in a new war,* Khrushchev--during the past year the principal Soviet spokesman on the outcome of a future war--has taken nine out of some 20 occasions when he discussed war and peace to predict that capitalism would be wiped out.** On three of those nine occasions, he declared, in response to direct questions, that mankind would definitely survive a war:

1. Answering U.P. correspondent Shapiro's question (18 November 1957) as to whether he believed a part of the world could be saved, Khrushchev said: "Of course the losses will be tremendous; mankind will go through great sufferings; but man will not disappear from the face of the earth, and society will live and develop."
2. In response to a similar question from James Reston (7 October 1957), he said that "despite great losses, mankind will not only survive, but will continue to develop."
3. In his CBS interview (28 May 1957), he said that war "would bring mankind great losses in men, destruction of wealth, but mankind will not perish after all."

Although he has argued that only capitalism would be destroyed and explicitly denied that war would destroy mankind, he has only three times advanced the positive corollary of the destruction-of-capitalism formula--the thesis that socialism would survive. He forecast the survival of "the socialist system" in his 3 April 1958 Budapest speech, in his 6 November 1957 speech to the Supreme Soviet, and in his interview with James Reston on 7 October 1957.

* In reversing Malenkov's heresy, Molotov had said in his 8 February 1955 Supreme Soviet speech: "It is not 'world civilization' that will perish, however much it may suffer from such new aggression, but the decaying social system of which bloodthirsty imperialism is the core...."

** Tab B reproduces Khrushchev's statements on the destruction of capitalism.

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Little About Destruction of Capitalism in Routine Comment

Khrushchev's most recent prediction of capitalism's destruction in a new war was on 18 April 1958 in his speech at the 13th Komsomol Congress. At the Moscow meeting of Warsaw Pact members, convened 24 May, he said more vaguely that war would mean "death" to the aggressor. But it was in a broadcast pegged to the Moscow meeting that the destruction-of-capitalism forecast appeared for the first time in routine radio propaganda in more than a year:

Experience has very convincingly shown that the positions-of-strength policy toward the socialist camp is doomed. Only people blinded by political prejudices or deprived of their senses can believe that they will succeed by force of arms in exterminating socialism. Another war, should it break out, will lead to the final destruction of the capitalist system. (Viktorov commentary widely broadcast in foreign languages, including Rumanian, on 29 May)

During the preceding five months, while the destruction-of-capitalism thesis was absent from routine radio propaganda, it had been restated in articles in the January, March and April issues of the political-analysis journal INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

1. In issue No. 1 of 1958, signed for the press 28 December 1957, M. Baturin wrote under the title "Peace and the Status Quo" that

if the enemies of peace succeed in starting a new world conflagration, its only possible outcome will be the final collapse of the capitalist system.

2. In issue No. 3, signed for the press 26 February 1958, Editor-in-Chief Ilychev wrote:

The world has entered a new stage of coexistence...when any attempt by the imperialists to launch a new world war will inevitably boomerang against the entire capitalist system and lead to its complete downfall.

Major General Talensky was more equivocal when he wrote in the same issue that

contemporary strategic forms of war are such as to bring fearful destruction to both sides. It is no longer possible to wage war without being exposed to enemy blows... an all-out war clearly threatens the capitalist system itself.... H. Kissinger...writes that the real struggle in total war will be between vulnerability and stability of social systems of belligerents. A thermonuclear blow can shatter the faith of a people in economy, government and national purpose.

3. In issue No. 4 signed for the press 20 March 1958, in an article commemorating the anniversary of Lenin's birth, L. Popov said:

Should the aggressive forces unleash a third world war, it would without a doubt end in the destruction of imperialism. The masses would no longer tolerate the existence of a social system which threatens incalculable loss of human life. But victory over capitalism would cost mankind dearly.

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Background on Destruction-of-Capitalism Predictions

In more than a year, only two Presidium members other than Khrushchev have repeated the destruction-of-capitalism forecast--Shvernik in his 11 March 1958 preelection speech and Furtseva in her Lenin Day address on 22 April 1957.* Furtseva's was the first enunciation of the thesis by a Soviet leader since it was revived at the XX CPSU Congress after a nine-month hiatus. At the February 1957 Supreme Soviet session--two months before Furtseva's speech--the then Foreign Minister Shepilov skirted the issue, addressing himself to the thesis introduced at the XX Congress that wars are not fatalistically inevitable.

The destruction of capitalism had been predicted at the XX Congress by Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Malenkov and Suslov. It was echoed in a 17 March 1956 home service talk by Candidate of Philosophy G. A. Fedorov, but only a few times thereafter.

Prior to its revival at the XX Congress, the thesis had last appeared in propaganda in the 14 May 1955 PRAVDA editorial which paraphrased Molotov's February 1955 reversal of the Malenkov heresy.

Soviet Military Victory Only Rarely Discussed

Khrushchev has generally kept his forecasts of the destruction of capitalism out of the context of relative East-West military strength. On six of the nine occasions when he predicted that capitalism would perish, he explained that this would be brought about by "the peoples," who would no longer tolerate a system that engenders wars. An exception occurred during his interview with Shapiro on 14 November 1957: He prefaced his destruction-of-capitalism prediction with the statement that

the actual correlation of forces is such that the militarists and monopolists would do well to pause and think--and think hard--before starting a war.

Khrushchev's graphic description in that interview of Soviet capabilities to heap destruction on the United States as well as West Europe approached Air Marshal Vershinin's contentions in his interview with PRAVDA on 8 September. But in stressing U.S. vulnerability, Khrushchev did not suggest as strongly as Vershinin did that the USSR as a national entity would be victorious. After flatly predicting the destruction of capitalism in

* Though the forecast was restated in the INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article on Lenin Day this year, it was not included in Pospelov's Lenin Day address. Pospelov scored British Lord Dundee for "being so blinded by his animal hatred of communism" that he would prefer the prospect of the destruction of half the world in a nuclear war. Pospelov attributed to Dundee the statement that after such a war "a small commonwealth of free people could again rebuild" and that this would be preferable to a "world where all could continue to live as slaves of Communist tyranny." But the Soviet spokesman did not refute Dundee by repeating past Soviet statements that the socialist system would survive a war.

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another war, the Marshal declared that Soviet military might ruled out the possibility of the Soviet Union being wiped out in "lightning fashion by air attacks."*

Even military leaders have usually confined themselves to statements that the Soviet armed forces could deal a "crushing rebuff" to any aggressor, rather than explicitly predicting military victory in a war. But some two weeks before the announcement of the Soviet ICBM test, Marshal Vesilevsky, replying to opinions by Admiral Burke, wrote in RED STAR (14 August 1957) that

the military might of the USSR, the possession of the most up-to-date weapons, including atomic and thermonuclear weapons, long-range and ultra long-range rockets all provide grounds for the victorious conclusion of any war, should it be launched by the imperialist aggressors against the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp.

But ICBM Called "Ultimate Weapon"

When Khrushchev discussed the destruction of capitalism in military terms in his interview with Shapiro, he said "there is no stopping" the ICBM. In his interview with Hearst, Conniff and Considine (22 November) Khrushchev for the first time described the ICBM as the "ultimate" weapon.

Soviet newscasts last August, after the ICBM test, had cited Western characterizations of the weapon as "ultimate," but Moscow commentators had made no such claims on their own. Soviet military spokesmen were usually careful to put a temporal qualifier on any characterizations of the weapon as invincible: Vershinin in PRAVDA and Major General Pokrovsky, in IZVESTIA on 31 August, had maintained that the ICBM could not be destroyed by "contemporary" means of anti-aircraft defense. In an 11 September SOVIET PATRIOT article, Pokrovsky acknowledged a possible future defense against the ICBM. And in a 14 September SOVIET RUSSIA article, Major General Semenov said that there were "almost no means of defense" against the ICBM.

In the March 1958 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Major General Talensky wrote that "in general the ICBM is invulnerable so far to the known anti-aircraft means." Earlier in the article Talensky had cited Stewart Alsop for the remark that "there is no known way to intercept long-range ballistic missiles. The defense against the ballistic missiles will remain strictly theoretical for a long time."

* A broadcast to Italy the next day was more explicit: "The argument of a surprise attack capable of smashing the USSR falls down; Soviet territory is immense and much less vulnerable to the conditions of modern warfare than the Atlantic Pact countries."

** Soviet broadcasts have not acknowledged Western discussions of the development of an anti-missile missile, but an article in the Defense Ministry journal MILITARY HERALD for March 1958 said that "at the end of 1957 in the American press, evidently in connection with the successes of the USSR in developing rocket technique..., information appeared that the United States has gone far in the development of intercepting ballistic rockets."

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Propaganda after the ICBM test and the sputnik launchings had implied that the danger of a Western attack had diminished. Moscow spoke of Western recognition of a "shift in the balance of forces" in favor of the bloc. Khrushchev told Shapiro that "today the balance of forces is such that even Mr. Dulles fears to go beyond the brink."

In the April 1958 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, I. Popov wrote:

The fact that the Soviet Union has the latest types of weapons and means of delivering them to any part of the globe has a sobering effect on some of the hotheads among the ruling classes of the Western powers, thus restraining them from unleashing an unprecedented and terrible war of annihilation.

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TAB AKHRUSHCHEV ON ACCIDENTAL WAR

All publicized statements by Khrushchev on the question of accidental war are reproduced below, in chronological order beginning with the most recent such statement.

Letter to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, 30 May 1958, released by TASS on 1 June 1958:

How can one fail to see that the U.S. actions [SAC flights toward Soviet frontiers], which are impermissible in time of peace and provocative, directly affect the interests of the security of the USSR and can at any time unleash a rocket and nuclear war as a result of an accident or miscalculation--a fact to which I have already called President Eisenhower's attention.

Would the reaction of the Canadian Government and people be different if the Soviet Union took steps resembling those which the American military command permits itself and began to practice flights of its bombers with atomic and hydrogen bombs toward the frontiers of Canada? It would hardly be different.

It would seem that the leaders of Canada, over whose territory the American bombers are flying with their load of atomic and hydrogen bombs, and where bases and technical facilities for these planes are located, should not be indifferent to such flights, which constitute, if the facts are faced squarely, a serious danger to Canada too. If there were many cases in the past of countries being drawn into war without their desire and intention, such a risk has increased one hundredfold in our day.

Speech at Warsaw Treaty powers' meeting in Moscow, 24 May 1958, released by TASS on 27 May:

Anyone with his mind unafflicted by war psychosis shares the feeling of grave alarm and righteous wrath which world public opinion experienced at the news that an atom bomb was "accidentally" dropped from an American bomber on a small town in the American state of South Carolina; and although the bomb failed to explode, the peoples of the world ask this legitimate question: What would happen if an incident like that is repeated and if this time a nuclear explosion with all its horrible consequences occurs? What is to gainsay the possibility that an accidental explosion of an American atomic or hydrogen bomb on American territory, or on the territory of some other nation over which American H-bombers are flying, may be taken for a surprise attack? There is nothing to guarantee that this will not happen. Thus, an accidental atomic bomb explosion may well trigger another world war.

A wave of indignation has swept all countries at the news that the United States systematically sends its military aircraft with atomic and hydrogen bombs flying toward the frontiers of the Soviet Union. Such activities of the American military command, which are unprecedented for peacetime, are indeed bringing the world to the brink of an atomic war.

It will be recalled that the Soviet Government has emphatically protested against these flights and has brought the matter before the U.N. Security Council. Nevertheless, the United States, far from having called a halt to the provocative flights of its aircraft, attempted to distract the attention of world opinion from the substance of the issue raised by the Soviet Union.

Letter to President Eisenhower, 22 April 1958, released by TASS on 23 April:

I should like to say that we in the Soviet Union could not overlook the reports that the U.S. military command had already repeatedly sent planes of the Strategic Air Force, loaded with hydrogen bombs, toward the USSR. According to these reports, orders for the take-off were given in view of the American radar stations' signals that Soviet guided missiles were allegedly approaching U.S. territory. It goes without saying that no Soviet missile threatens or has ever threatened the United States and that, as one should have expected, American radar stations issued wrong signals.

It is needless to say how dangerous such flights of American planes loaded with hydrogen bombs toward the frontiers of the Soviet Union are to the cause of peace. It is not clear that, in these conditions, a simple mistake in the transmission of signals might trigger a world catastrophe?*

Just imagine for a minute, Mr. President, what would happen if the Soviet command, acting the way the American military command is acting now, sent planes loaded with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the United States on the grounds that its radar stations sounded warnings of approaching American military planes, or if the Soviet military command, in reply to the provocative flights of the American planes, decided in its turn to send Soviet military aircraft loaded with hydrogen bombs in the direction of the United States. In these conditions, such flights by Soviet planes would be perfectly justified. Suffice it to put the question this way, and it at once becomes clear how dangerous such actions of the American command are.

You might say that my definitions are too sharp when I speak about these irresponsible and provocative actions of the American military command. However, I am compelled to speak in this manner by the alarm I feel when I think that in the climate of a military psychosis, so characteristic of certain circles in your country, a world tragedy involving the loss of millions upon millions of human lives may occur unexpectedly to all of us.

Speech at a Budapest mass meeting, 4 April 1958:

Matters have been carried so far that American aircraft, equipped with atomic and hydrogen bombs, are making daily flights over the territories of many countries. There have even been cases of such aircraft

* In his 9 May 1958 letter to the President, agreeing to technical talks on a nuclear test ban, Khrushchev briefly reiterated his warning of the danger from the SAC flights "toward" Soviet frontiers without specifying the danger as one of "accidental war."

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crashing, which fact could not be concealed from the public. Millions of people are living in constant fear lest some accident or intentional provocation by a demented person should throw mankind into an atomic war.

Pre-election speech, 14 March 1958:

People cannot live safely as long as the possibility exists that some imperialist provocateurs may risk unleashing a war. And under present tense conditions and existing suspicion, little is needed: The accidental appearance of a foreign plane, its accidental dropping of a bomb, may cause a military conflict which may become a general war.

Strange as it may seem, there are some official personages in the United States and Britain who argue in favor of the need for flights of bombers carrying H-bombs. The more planes carrying hydrogen arms there are in the air, the less room remains for the doves of peace and the more space for the machinations of the demon of war.

Speech to the Supreme Soviet, 21 December 1957:

In reality, modern military bases inevitably threaten the peaceful populations of entire countries with annihilation. How great this danger is may be seen, for instance, from the fact that a considerable proportion of the American bombers carrying atomic and hydrogen loads are cruising day and night over various countries where American bases are located.

Imagine that one of the airmen may, even without any evil intent but through nervous mental derangement or an incorrectly understood order, drop his deadly load on the territory of some country. Then, according to the logic of war, an immediate counterblow will follow. A worldwide conflagration can break out in this manner.

Interview with Hearst and other INS correspondents, 22 November 1957, released by TASS on 29 November:

It was reported that, allegedly, a part of the American bomber force, with hydrogen and atomic bombs, is constantly in the air and always ready to strike against the Soviet Union. Reports have it that one-half of the planes are in the air. This is very dangerous. Such a situation serves as an illustration of the extent of the military psychosis in the United States.

When planes with hydrogen bombs take off, that means that many people will be in the air piloting them. There is always the possibility of a mental blackout when the pilot may take the slightest signal as a signal for action and fly to the target that he had been instructed to fly to. Under such conditions a war may start purely by chance, since retaliatory action would be taken immediately.

Does this not go to show that in such a case a war may start as a result of a sheer misunderstanding, a derangement in the normal psychic state of a person, which may happen to anybody? We must see to it that such a horrible possibility is excluded. It may be that both sides will be against war, and yet war may still start as a result of the military psychosis whipped up in the United States....

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Even if only one plane with one atomic or one hydrogen bomb were in the air, in this case, too, it would be not the government but the pilot who could decide the question of war. And this, as you may imagine, would be a terrible thing.*

Interview with Turner Catledge of the New York TIMES, 11 May 1957:

...one should take into account that since atomic and hydrogen weapons, rockets, and intercontinental missiles exist, the possibility is not excluded that by some fatal mistake or accident a war might be unleashed which would bring untold suffering not only to the peoples of our two countries, but also to the peoples of the whole world.

Interview with Tomoo Kirooka, editor of the Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN, 18 June 1957, released by TASS on 29 June:

One must also bear in mind that when weapons are stockpiled, some people may be tempted to use them. Hotheads begin to think: Is it not time to start a real war? ...One cannot keep peoples constantly in terror of war, subject them to the whims of rabid militarists. One cannot grow fat on the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons. One cannot permit war to be unleashed by a mere accident, letting millions of human beings and material values created by man's labor be wiped out.

* Khrushchev has on several occasions alluded to dangers from the U.S. nuclear-armed flights without saying that they could lead to accidental war: in his 22 January Minsk speech, his February letter to a British anti-nuclear weapons group, his 5 March letter to Lord Russell, his 10 April Moscow Stadium speech, his 26 April Kiev speech, and his 30 April speech at a luncheon for Nasir.

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TAB BKHRUSHCHEV ON THE DESTRUCTION OF CAPITALISM

All publicized statements made by Khrushchev since the XX CPSU Congress on capitalism's destruction in the event of war are reproduced below, in chronological order beginning with his most recent such prediction.

(Statements by Furtseva and Shvernik--the only other CPSU Presidium members to have made such predictions publicly since the XX Congress--are reproduced at the end of this compilation. Also reproduced are similar predictions contained in the CPSU Theses on the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, published on 15 September 1957, and in the 12-Party Declaration issued after the November 1957 Communist "summit" meeting.)

Speech to the 13th Komsomol Congress, 18 April 1958:

We are convinced that if the imperialists foist war upon us, it will be the last war because peoples will no longer put up with the capitalist system which gives rise to wars and takes millions of the best human lives.

Speech at the Budapest Opera House, 3 April 1958:

We need not be scientists or military experts to understand that a future war, if it were unleashed by criminal forces, would cause immeasurable harm to all mankind.... It is our firm conviction that in the event of an armed conflict, the socialist system would be victorious and the capitalist system would be unable to weather the grave ordeals.

Letter to Lord Russell, 5 March 1958, published in NEW STATESMAN on 15 March and released by Moscow on the 26th:

Modern armaments, atomic and hydrogen bombs will be exceptionally dangerous during time of war not only for the two warring states in terms of direct devastation and destruction of human beings; they will also be deadly for states wishing to stay apart from the military operations, since the poisoned soil, air, food, and so forth would become the source of terrible torments and the slow annihilation of millions of people.

There is in the world today an enormous quantity of atomic and hydrogen bombs. According to scientists' calculations, if they were all to be exploded simultaneously, the existence of almost every living thing on earth would be threatened....

I think that if imperialism unleashes a new world war, it will perish in it. The peoples will not put up with a system which cannot exist without wars, without the annihilation of millions of people, to enrich a handful of monopolists.

Speech in Minsk, 22 January 1958:

If the imperialists unleash another war, it will inevitably lead to the destruction of those who start it. The peoples will do away forever with the system which brings mankind untold suffering and bloody wars.

Speech to the Supreme Soviet, 21 December 1957:

The latest types of armaments are so powerful that their use in war could imperil the existence of whole countries.... In reality, modern military bases inevitably threaten the peaceful populations of entire countries with annihilation.

The process of historic development is inexorable. It cannot be stopped by any reactionary forces. Should they try to do so by force of arms and unleash war, they will dig their graves with their own hands. The peoples will no longer tolerate a system which gives birth to wars and brings to mankind torment and suffering.

Interview with U.P. correspondent Shapiro, 14 November 1957, released by Moscow on 18 November:

This does not mean that war cannot flare up. As I have said, one cannot vouch for a madman. But the actual correlation of forces is such that the militarists and monopolists would do well to pause and think--and think hard--before starting a war. It is our conviction that if a war is started--and only imperialist countries can do it because no socialist state is interested in war--capitalism will be routed. And it will be the last suffering that the capitalist world will have inflicted on mankind, for capitalism will be done with once and for all.

Shapiro: You believe that a part of the world can be saved in an atomic and nuclear war?

Khrushchev: Of course the losses will be tremendous, mankind will go through great sufferings; but man will not disappear from the face of the earth and society will live and develop.

Speech at the Jubilee Session of the Supreme Soviet, 6 November 1957*:

With the contemporary development of military technique, an attempt of the imperialists to unleash a world war would lead to inconceivably great destruction and losses. The use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, of ballistic rockets would result in enormous calamity for all mankind. In provoking this calamity the capitalist regime will doom itself to an inevitable end. The peoples will no longer countenance a system which brings torment and suffering to mankind and unleashes bloody aggressive wars.

* Defense Minister Malinovsky did not forecast the destruction of capitalism in his October Revolution anniversary speech in Red Square the following day: The USSR's "peaceable policy," he said, stems from "deep understanding that a new war with the use of modern atomic and thermonuclear weapons would mean the destruction of many millions of people, the destruction of colossal material values created by the toil of many generations."

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Although we are convinced that as a result of a new war, should it be unleashed by capitalist circles, the system which creates wars, the capitalist system, would perish and the socialist system would win, we Communists do not aspire for victory in this way; we Communists have never striven and will never strive to achieve our aims by such terrible means.

Interview with New York TIMES correspondent Reston, 7 October 1957, released by Moscow on 11 October:

...a new war with modern deadly types of weapons such as thermonuclear bombs, and with the means of their delivery such as the intercontinental ballistic missile, would mean death for millions upon millions of people and the destruction of enormous material values created by the labor of many generations.... It is common knowledge that as a result of previous wars many countries, which now make up the world system of socialism, broke away from the capitalist system. A third world war could only end in the collapse of capitalism.

Reston: Do you consider, Mr. First Secretary, that only the capitalist states would be destroyed as a result of a new war, while Communism would prevail?

Khrushchev: When saying that a new world war could only end in collapse for capitalism, we do not mean to say at all that socialist countries would not suffer losses in such a war. With modern weapons of destruction such as they are, the losses would, of course, be colossal. But we are convinced that socialism will live, while capitalism will not remain. For despite great losses, mankind will not only survive, but will continue to develop. The peoples will draw the conclusion that a system engendering wars and causing them such misery and suffering cannot be tolerated any longer.

Interview with CBS, 28 May 1957, broadcast by Moscow on 3 June:

Some reproach me for allegedly changing my point of view, since I once said that if an atomic war came about it would be capitalism that would perish in that war. This I repeat today. But we think that capitalism should be destroyed not by means of war and military conflicts but through an ideological and economic struggle....

[Cutler, referring to Khrushchev's remark that a future war would destroy capitalism, asked him whether he thought a future war would destroy Communism as well.] No it would not. It would bring mankind great calamities, great losses in men, destruction of wealth, but mankind would not perish after all. And since mankind would continue to exist, the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are immortal. That is why mankind would be rid of capitalism. But war is such a price that we should not resort to it. It would be harmful to the socialist countries as well as to the capitalist countries.

* * *

SHVERNIK's preelection speech in Moscow, 11 March 1958:

We peoples of the countries of the socialist camp have something to defend and we have all the means for this defense. And let the Messrs. Aggressors remember that a war launched by them against our country will not be an easy military walk but a genuine all-inclusive struggle which will inevitably bring about the downfall of capitalism.

FURTSEVA's Lenin Day speech in Moscow, 22 April 1957:

There can be no doubt that any attempt by aggressive forces to unleash fresh bloodshed on a worldwide scale would provoke such a rebuff by the free peoples of the socialist camp and of all peace-loving forces as would bring about the collapse of the entire capitalist system.

CPSU THESES on the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, published 15 September 1957:

If, however, the forces of imperialism should dare to unleash a new world war, they will face such indignation and opposition from the peoples as will bring about the final collapse of the entire capitalist system.

12-PARTY DECLARATION issued after the Communist "summit" talks in Moscow, 22 November 1957:

...should the bellicose imperialist maniacs venture, regardless of anything, to unleash a war, imperialism will doom itself to destruction, for the peoples will not tolerate a system that brings them so much suffering and exacts so many sacrifices.

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